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Abstract Business cycles among industrial countries are highly correlated. We develop
a two-country behavioral macroeconomic model where the synchronization of the
business cycle is produced endogenously. The main channel of synchronization occurs
through a propagation of “animal spirits”, i.e. waves of optimism and pessimism that
become correlated internationally. We find that this propagation occurs with relatively
low levels of trade integration. We do not need a correlation of exogenous shocks to
generate synchronization. We also empirically test the main predictions of the model.
Keywords Animal spirits . Behavioral macroeconomics . Business cycles
1 Introduction
An important empirical feature of the international economy is the high correlation of
the business cycles across countries. We show this feature both for the group of
Eurozone countries and a group of industrialized countries outside the Eurozone.
Table 1 presents the bilateral correlations of the business cycle components of GDP
in the Eurozone. The business cycle component is obtained by using a Hodrick-Prescott
(HP) filter on GDP data. We apply a similar procedure for the group on industrial
countries outside the Eurozone.
It is striking to find how high these correlation coefficients are. This is especially the
case within the Eurozone were we find many correlation coefficients of the business
cycle components exceeding 0.9. On average we find that this correlation coefficient is
0.82, suggesting a very high degree of synchronization of the business cycles within the
Eurozone. This is confirmed in Fig. 1 showing the evolution of the business cycle
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components of GDP growth in the Eurozone. This clearly shows that Eurozone
countries have experienced more or less the same business cycle movements since
1995. If there is a difference between these countries it is to be found in the amplitude
of the business cycle movements (see De Grauwe and Ji 2016 for an analysis of the
implications of these different amplitudes). We are aware of the fact that measuring
business cycles is fraught with difficulties (see Giannone et al. 2008). However, our
findings are consistent with others (see de Haan et al. 2008; Belke et al. 2016).
Outside the Eurozone we observe smaller bilateral correlations of the business cycles
than in the Eurozone. However, these correlations can still be called quite high. They
often reach levels of 0.6 or more. Poland stands out as the only country with negative
correlations. The average of all the correlation coefficients in Table 2 is 0.61. Thus it
appears that in the group of industrial countries outside the Eurozone business cycles
are also quite synchronized.
There exists empirical evidence that the degree of synchronization of the business
cycles is influenced by the degree of trade integration. Frankel and Rose (1998) found
that increasing trade integration leads to more synchronization of the business cycles.
This has been confirmed by other empirical studies (see Artis and Cleays 2005; Bordo
and Helbling 2004).
Trade integration is one explanatory factor, but it does not explain everything. This
is made clear by Figs. 2 and 3 which plot the bilateral correlation coefficients obtained
from Tables 1 and 2 with the bilateral trade flows (as a percent of the sum of the GDPs
of the pairs of countries involved). We observe that there is a positive relation between
the degree of bilateral trade integration and bilateral correlations. This relation, how-
ever, is weak and explains only a small fraction of the variation in the bilateral
correlations. Clearly there are other mechanisms at work driving the synchronization
of business cycles. It is the intention of this paper to uncover these other mechanisms.
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Fig. 1 Business cycle components of GDP growth. Source: De Grauwe and Ji (2016)
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Mainstream macroeconomic models (both real business cycle models and DSGE
models) have found it difficult to replicate the observed high synchronization of
business cycles in the industrialized world. This problem was first pointed out by
Backus et al. (1992) who found that standard open economy versions of real business cycle
models could not explain the high level of synchronization of the business cycles across
countries (see also Canova and Dellas 1993). Open economy versions of DSGE-models
have experienced the same problem (see Kollmann 1995; Alpanda and Aysun 2014). Of
course one can solve these problems in these models by assuming high positive correlations
of exogenous shocks. But this is not really an explanation as it forces the designers of these
models to admit that high correlations of the business cycles across countries are produced
outside their models. This is not a very satisfactory analysis.
Source: authors’ own estimation using data from OECD and IMF, direction of 
trade
Fig. 2 Correlation of business cycle and trade links in 11 Eurozone countries. Source: authors’ own
estimation using data from OECD and IMF, direction of trade
Source: authors’ own estimation using data from OECD and IMF, direction of  
trade
Fig. 3 Correlation of business cycle and trade links in 12 stand-alone countries. Source: authors’ own
estimation using data from OECD and IMF, direction of trade
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There have been attempts to explain the high synchronization of the business cycles
across countries by introducing financial integration in the models (see e.g. Stockman and
Tesar 1995; Gertler et al. 2007; Devereux andYetman 2010; Kollmann, et al. 2012; Alpanda
and Aysun 2014). This goes some way in explaining this synchronization. But again too
much is “explained” by introducing highly correlated exogenous financial shocks (see Rey
2014).
In this paper we want to go further. We want to analyze the mechanism through which
business cycles are synchronized across countries that trade with each other. We will do this
using a behavioral macroeconomic model similar to De Grauwe (2012) but in a two-county
setting.Wewill show that the transmission of business cyclemovements ismade possible by
a dynamics that leads to correlation of “animal spirits” across countries.Wewill develop this
model in the context of two different monetary regimes. The first one is a monetary union
between the two countries. The second one assumes two “standalone” countries each one
with their own central bank.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a two-country version of
our behavioral macroeconomic model. Section 3 discusses the solutions of this model and
sections 4 uses the model to analyze the factors that affect the international synchronization
of the business cycles. Section 5 presents empirical evidence and section 6 concludes.
2 The two country behavioral model
2.1 Model Choice
Mainstreammacroeconomics has been based on two fundamental ideas. The first one is that
macroeconomic models should be micro-founded, i.e. they should start from individual
optimization and then aggregate these individuals’ optimal plans to obtain a general
equilibrium model. This procedure leads to intractable and well-known aggregation prob-
lems (Sonnenschein 1972; Kirman; 1993) that cannot easily be solved. This has led DSGE-
model builders to circumvent the aggregation problems by introducing the representative
agent, i.e. by assuming that demand and supply decisions in the aggregate can be reduced to
decisions made at the individual level.
The second idea is that expectations should be rational, i.e. should take all available
information into account, including the information about the structure of the economic
model and the distribution of the shocks hitting the economy.
These two ideas lead to problems. First, the use of a representative agent has the
effect of brushing under the carpet the interesting sources of macroeconomic dynamics
which come from the fact that agents are heterogeneous and therefore have different
beliefs about the state of the economy. Second, the use of rational expectations implies
that individual agents have extraordinary cognitive abilities, which we believe are
implausible in a world of great complexity.
Therefore we make a different choice of model. First, we will bring at center stage the
heterogeneity of agents in that they have different beliefs about the state of the economy. The
price we pay is that we do not microfound the model and assume the existence of aggregate
demand and supply equations. Second, we assume that agents have cognitive limitations
preventing them from having rational expectations. Instead they will be assumed to follow
simple rules of thumb (heuristics). Rationality will be introduced by assuming a willingness
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to learn from mistakes and therefore a willingness to switch between different heuristics. In
making these choices we follow the road taken by an increasing number of
macroeconomists, which have developed “agent-based models” and “behavioral macroeco-
nomic models” (Tesfatsion 2001; Tesfatsion and Judd 2006; Colander et al. 2008; Farmer
and Foley 2009; Gatti et al. 2011; Westerhoff 2012; De Grauwe 2012; Hommes and
Lustenhouwer 2016).
2.2 Basic Model
Following De Grauwe (2012), we use a simple behavioral macroeconomic model and we
extend it to two countries that trade with each other. The basic structure of this behavioural
model is the same as themainstreamNew-Keynesianmodel as described in e.g. Galí (2008).
Themodel consists of two aggregate demand equations, two aggregate supply equations and
a Taylor rule. To keep themodel simple, we assume that the two countries are symmetric and
therefore exhibit the same parameters. We will also discuss the model in two monetary
regimes, one is in a monetary union with a common central bank and a common short-term
interest rate, the other regime is two countries with their own independent central banks and
different interest rates. In the second regime, we will have two independent Taylor rules.
The aggregate demand equations for countries 1 and 2 are specified in the standard
way, i.e.
y1t ¼ a1~Ety1tþ1 þ 1−a1ð Þy1t−1 þ a2 rt−~Etπ1tþ1
 
þ x1t −m1t
 þ ε1t ð1Þ
y2t ¼ a1~Ety2tþ1 þ 1−a1ð Þy2t−1 þ a2 rt−~Etπ2tþ1
 
þ x2t −m2t
 þ ε2t ð2Þ
where y1t and y
2
t are the output gaps for country 1 and 2 in period t, rt. is the nominal
interest rate, π1t and π
2
t are the rates of inflation for country 1 and 2 in period t, and ε
1
t and
ε2t are white noise disturbance terms for country 1 and 2. ~E
i
t is the expectations operator
where the tilde above E refers to expectations that are not formed rationally. This
expectations formations process will be specified subsequently.We follow the procedure
introduced in New Keynesian macroeconomic models of adding a lagged output y1t−1
and y2t−1 in the demand equation (see Galí 2008; Woodford 2003). This is usually
justified by invoking habit formation. We also take into account trade links between
the two countries: x1t and x
2
t as the exports of countries 1 and 2,m
1
t andm
2
t the imports of
countries 1 and 2. These variables are also defined as gaps, i.e. the difference between
the actual values and the values obtained in the steady state when the output gap is zero.
Assuming that the import propensity, m, is the same in both countries and that the two
countries only trade with each other, the aggregate demand equations for countries 1 and
2 can be rewritten as follows:
y1t ¼
a1
1þ m
~Ety1tþ1 þ
1−a1
1þ m y
1
t−1 þ
a2
1þ m rt−
~Etπ1tþ1
 
þ m
1þ m y
2
t þ
ε1t
1þ m ð3Þ
y2t ¼
a1
1þ m
~Ety2tþ1 þ
1−a1
1þ m y
2
t−1 þ
a2
1þ m rt−
~Etπ2tþ1
 
þ m
1þ m y
1
t þ
ε2t
1þ m ð4Þ
The aggregate supply equation aggregate demand equation has a very simple interpre-
tation. Utilitymaximizing agents will want to spendmore on goods and services todaywhen
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they expect future income (output gap) to increase and to spend less when the real interest
rate increases. Moreover, the existence of trade between the two countries creates a positive
link between the output gaps of these countries.
We should stress that we make a strong simplifying assumption. We consider the
import propensity, m, to be constant. This implies that import and export decisions are
not sensitive to relative price changes. We plan to relax this assumption in future
research.
We assume an aggregate supply equation of the New Keynesian Philips curve type.
In addition, it is assumed that producers cannot adjust their prices instantaneously.
Instead, for institutional reasons, they have to wait to adjust their prices. The most
popular specification of this price adjustment mechanism is the Calvo pricing mecha-
nism (Calvo 1983). This assumes that in period t, a fraction of prices remains
unchanged. Under those conditions the aggregate supply equation for countries 1
and 2 can be written as:
π1t ¼ b1~Etπ1tþ1 þ 1−b1ð Þπ1tþ1 þ b2y1t þ η1t ð5Þ
π2t ¼ b1~Etπ2tþ1 þ 1−b1ð Þπ2tþ1 þ b2y2t þ η2t ð6Þ
Equations (3)–(6) determine the four endogenous variables, inflation π1t and π
2
t , and
output gap y1t and y
2
t , given the nominal interest rate rt. The model has to be closed by
specifying the way the nominal interest rate is determined. The most popular way to do
this has been to invoke the Taylor rule (see Taylor (1993)) that describes the behavior of
the central bank. In a monetary union, this rule is written as follows:
rt ¼ c1 πt−π*
 
þ c2yt þ c3rt−1 þ ut ð7Þ
where πt ¼ 12 π1t þ π2t
 
and yt ¼ 12 y1t þ y2t
 
, π∗ is the inflation target and we will
assume it is zero. Thus the central bank is assumed to raise the interest when the observed
inflation rate increases relative to the announced inflation target. The intensity with which
it does this is measured by the coefficient c1. It has been shown (see Woodford 2003 or
Galí 2008) that it must exceed 1 for the model to be stable. This is also sometimes called
the “Taylor principle”.1
When the output gap increases the central bank is assumed to raise the interest rate.
The intensity with which it does this is measured by c2. The latter parameter then also
tells us something about the ambitions the central bank has to stabilize output. A central
bank that does not care about output stabilization sets c2 = 0. We say that this central
bank applies strict inflation targeting. Finally, note that, as is commonly done, the central
bank is assumed to smooth the interest rate. This smoothing behavior is represented by
the lagged interest rate in Eq. (7).
1 Ideally, the Taylor rule should be formulated using a forward-looking inflation variable, i.e. central banks set
the interest rate on the basis of their forecasts about the rate of inflation. This is not done here in order to
maintain simplicity in the model (again see Woodford 2003, p. 257). As is shown in Woodford (2003) forward
looking Taylor rules may not lead to a determinate solution even if the Taylor principle is satisfied. See also
Blatner and Margaritov(2010)
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We have added error terms in each of the equations. These error terms describe the
nature of the different shocks that can hit the economy. There are demand shocks ε1t and
ε2t , supply shocks η
1
t and η
2
t , and interest rate shocks, ut . We will generally assume that
these shocks are normally distributed with mean zero and a constant standard deviation.
We will allow these shocks to be correlated across countries.
As mentioned earlier, we will also want to apply this model in a regime in which the
two countries are not member of a monetary union, i.e. they have their own indepen-
dent central banks and two short term interest rates. Accordingly, the aggregate demand
equations can then be rewritten as:
y1t ¼
a1
1þ m
~Ety1tþ1 þ
1−a1
1þ m y
1
t−1 þ
a2
1þ m r
1
t −~Etπ
1
tþ1
 
þ m
1þ m y
2
t þ
ε1t
1þ m ð8Þ
y2t ¼
a1
1þ m
~Ety2tþ1 þ
1−a1
1þ m y
2
t−1 þ
a2
1þ m r
2
t −~Etπ
2
tþ1
 
þ m
1þ m y
1
t þ
ε2t
1þ m ð9Þ
The Taylor rule in each central bank can be written as follows:
r1t ¼ c1 π1t −π*
 þ c2y1t þ c3r1t−1 þ u1t ð10Þ
r2t ¼ c1 π2t −π*
 þ c2y2t þ c3r2t−1 þ u2t ð11Þ
Clearly in this version of the model there is an exchange rate that will vary as central
banks set their interest rates independently. We will disregard this exchange rate
channel here and leave this for further research.
2.3 Introducing Heuristics in Forecasting Output and Inflation
In the world of rational expectations that forms the basis of the mainstream model
agents are assumed to understand the complexities of the world. In contrast, we take the
view that agents have cognitive limitations. They only understand tiny little bits of the
world. In such a world agents are likely to use simple rules, heuristics, to forecast the
future (see e.g. Damasio 2003; Kahneman 2002; Camerer et al. 2005).
Agents who use simple rules of behavior are not irrational. They use simple rules
only because the real world is too complex to understand, but they are willing to learn
from their mistakes, i.e. they regularly subject the rules they use to some criterion of
success. This leads to the concept of adaptive learning.
Adaptive learning is a procedure whereby agents use simple forecasting rules and then
subject these rules to a “fitness” test, i.e., agents endogenously select the forecasting rules
that have delivered the highest performance (“fitness”) in the past. Thus, an agent will
start using one particular rule. She will regularly evaluate this rule against the alternative
rules. If the former rule performs well, she keeps it. If not, she switches to another rule. In
this sense the rule can be called a “trial and error” rule.
The International Synchronisation of Business Cycles 391
This “trial and error” selection mechanism acts as a disciplining device on the kind
of rules that are acceptable. Not every rule is acceptable. It has to perform well. What
that means will be made clear later. It is important to have such a disciplining device,
otherwise everything becomes possible. The need to discipline the forecasting rule was
also one of the basic justifications underlying rational expectations. By imposing the
condition that forecasts must be consistent with the underlying model, the model
builder severely limits the rule that agents can use to make forecasts. The adaptive
selections mechanism used here plays a similar disciplining role.
Agents are assumed to use simple rules (heuristics) to forecast the future output
and inflation. The way we proceed is as follows. We assume two types of
forecasting rules. A first rule can be called a “fundamentalist” one. Agents estimate
the steady state value of the output gap (which is normalized at 0) and use this to
forecast the future output gap.2 A second forecasting rule is an “extrapolative” one.
This is a rule that does not presuppose that agents know the steady state output
gap. They are agnostic about it. Instead, they extrapolate the previous observed output
gap into the future.
The two rules that are followed in the two countries are specified as follows:
The fundamentalist rule is defined by ~E
f
t ytþ1 ¼ 0 ð12Þ
The extrapolative rule is defined by ~E
e
t ytþ1 ¼ yt−1 ð13Þ
We have dropped the country superscripts here (and in what follows). Thus Eqs. (12)
and (13) apply to agents in both countries.
This kind of simple heuristic has often been used in the behavioral finance literature
where agents are assumed to use fundamentalist and chartist rules (see Brock and
Hommes 1997; Branch and Evans 2006; De Grauwe and Grimaldi 2006). The rules are
simple in the sense that they only require agents to use information they understand,
and do not require them to understand the whole picture. Some experimental evidence
in support of the two rules similar to (12) and (13) for inflation forecasts in a New
Keynesian model can be found in a paper by Pfajfar and Žakelj (2009). For a survey of
the experimental evidence see Hommes (2016).
The market forecast is obtained as a weighted average of these two forecasts, i.e.
~Etytþ1 ¼ α f ;t~E
f
t ytþ1 þ αc;t~E
e
t ytþ1 ð14Þ
~Etytþ1 ¼ α f ;t0þ αc;tyt−1 ð15Þ
where αf,t and αe,t are the probabilities that agents use a fundamentalist, respectively, an
extrapolative rule and αf , t +αe , t = 1.
2 In De Grauwe (2012) this rule is extended to the case in which agents do not know the steady state output
gap with certainty and only have biased estimates of it. This is also done in Hommes and Lustenhouwer
(2016).
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2.3.1 Selecting the Forecasting Rules
As indicated earlier, agents in our model are willing to learn, i.e. they contin-
uously evaluate their forecast performance. This willingness to learn and to
change one’s behavior is the most fundamental definition of rational behavior.
Our agents are rational in the sense that they learn from their mistakes. The
concept of “bounded rationality” is often used to characterize this behavior
(Simon 1957; Kahneman 2002; Gigerenzer and Selten 2002).
The first step in the analysis then consists in defining a criterion of success.
This will be the forecast performance of a particular rule. Thus in this first
step, agents compute the forecast performance of the two different forecasting
rules as follows:
U f ;t ¼ −∑∞k¼0ωk yt−k−1−~E f ;t−k−2yt−k−1
h i2
ð16Þ
Ue;t ¼ −∑∞k¼0ωk yt−k−1−~Ee;t−k−2yt−k−1
h i2
ð17Þ
where Uf,t and Ue,t are the utilities obtained from the fundamentalist and extrapolating
rules, respectively. These are defined as the negative of the mean squared forecasting
errors (MSFEs) of the forecasting rules; ωk are geometrically declining weights. We
make these weights declining because we assume that agents tend to forget. Put
differently, they give a lower weight to errors made far in the past as compared to
errors made recently.
The next step consists in evaluating these forecast performances (utilities). We apply
discrete choice theory (see Anderson et al. 1992 for a thorough analysis of discrete
choice theory and Brock and Hommes 1997 for the first application in finance) in
specifying the procedure agents follow in this evaluation process. If agents were
purely rational they would just compare Uf,t and Ue,t in (16) and (17) and choose
the rule that produces the highest value. Thus under pure rationality, agents would
choose the fundamentalist rule if Uf,t > Ue,t, and vice versa. However, psycholo-
gists have found out that when we have to choose among alternatives we are also
influenced by our state of mind. The latter is to a large extent unpredictable. It can
be influenced by many things, the weather, recent emotional experiences, etc. One
way to formalize this is that the utilities of the two alternatives have a deterministic
component (these areUf,t andUe,t in (16) and (17)) and a random component εf,t and εe,t
The probability of choosing the fundamentalist rule is then given by
α f ;t ¼ P U f ;t þ ε f ;t
 
> Ue;t þ εe;t
   ð18Þ
In words, this means that the probability of selecting the fundamentalist rule is equal
to the probability that the stochastic utility associated with using the fundamentalist rule
exceeds the stochastic utility of using an extrapolative rule. In order to derive a more
precise expression one has to specify the distribution of the random variables εf,t and εe,t
. It is customary in the discrete choice literature to assume that these random variables
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are logistically distributed (see Anderson et al. (1992), p. 35). One then obtains the
following expressions for the probability of choosing the fundamentalist rule:
α f ;t ¼
exp γU f ;t
 
exp γU f ;t
 þ exp γUe;t  ð19Þ
Similarly the probability that an agent will use the extrapolative forecasting rule is
given by:
αe;t ¼
exp γUe;t
 
exp γU f ;t
 þ exp γUe;t  ¼ 1−α f ;t ð20Þ
Equation (19) says that as the past forecast performance of the fundamentalist rule
improves relative to that of the extrapolative rule, agents are more likely to select the
fundamentalist rule for their forecasts of the output gap. Equation (20) has a similar
interpretation. The parameter γ measures the “intensity of choice”. It is related to the
variance of the random components εf,t and εe,t. If the variance is very high, γ
approaches 0. In that case agents decide to be fundamentalist or extrapolator by tossing
a coin and the probability to be fundamentalist (or extrapolator) is exactly 0.5. When
γ = ∞ the variance of the random components is zero (utility is then fully deterministic)
and the probability of using a fundamentalist rule is either 1 or 0. The parameter γ can
also be interpreted as expressing a willingness to learn from past performance. When
γ = 0 this willingness is zero; it increases with the size of γ.
It should be mentioned here that the probabilities αf,t and αe,t can also be interpreted
as the fractions of agents that use a fundamentalist and extrapolative forecasting rule,
respectively. This can be seen as follows. Suppose the number of agents is N. Then,
if the probability that an agent uses a fundamentalist rule is αf,t , on average αf,tN
agents will use this rule. Thus the fraction of the total number of agents using this
rule is αftNN = αf,t. . The same holds for αe,t. These fractions are determined by the rules
(19) and (20) and are time dependent. This illustrates an important feature of the model,
i.e. the heterogeneity of beliefs and their shifting nature over time.
As argued earlier, the selection mechanism used should be interpreted as a learning
mechanism based on “trial and error”. When observing that the rule they use performs
less well than the alternative rule, agents are willing to switch to the more performing
rule. Put differently, agents avoid making systematic mistakes by constantly being
willing to learn from past mistakes and to change their behavior. This also ensures that
the market forecasts are unbiased.
2.3.2 Heuristics and Selection Mechanism in Forecasting Inflation
Agents also have to forecast inflation. A similar simple heuristics is used as in the case
of output gap forecasting, with one rule that could be called a fundamentalist rule and
the other an extrapolative rule. (See Brazier et al. (2006) for a similar setup). We
assume an institutional set-up in which the central bank announces an explicit inflation
target. The fundamentalist rule then is based on this announced inflation target, i.e.
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agents using this rule have confidence in the credibility of this rule and use it to forecast
inflation. Agents who do not trust the announced inflation target use the extrapolative
rule, which consists in extrapolating inflation from the past into the future.
The fundamentalist rule will be called an “inflation targeting” rule. It consists in
using the central bank’s inflation target to forecast future inflation, i.e.
~E
tar
t πtþ1 ¼ π* ð21Þ
where the inflation target π∗ is normalized to be equal to 0. The “extrapolators” are
defined by
Eextt πtþ1 ¼ πt−1 ð22Þ
The market forecast is a weighted average of these two forecasts, i.e.
~Etπtþ1 ¼ βtar;t~Etart πtþ1 þ βext;t~Eextt πtþ1 ð23Þ
or
~Etπtþ1 ¼ βtar;tπ* þ βext;tπt−1 ð24Þ
and
βtar;t þ βext;t ¼ 1 ð25Þ
The same selection mechanism is used as in the case of output forecasting to
determine the probabilities of agents trusting the inflation target and those who do
not trust it and revert to extrapolation of past inflation, i.e.
βtar;t ¼
exp γUtar;t
 
exp γUtar;t
 þ exp γUext;t  ð26Þ
βext;t ¼
exp γUext;t
 
exp γUtar;t
 þ exp γUext;t  ð27Þ
where Utar,t and Uext,t are the forecast performances (utilities) associated with the use of
the fundamentalist and extrapolative rules. These are defined in the same way as in (16)
and (17), i.e. they are the negatives of the weighted averages of past squared forecast
errors of using fundamentalist (inflation targeting) and extrapolative rules, respectively.
This inflation forecasting heuristics can be interpreted as a procedure of agents to
find out how credible the central bank’s inflation targeting is. If this is very credible,
using the announced inflation target will produce good forecasts and as a result, the
probability that agents will rely on the inflation target will be high. If on the other hand
the inflation target does not produce good forecasts (compared to a simple extrapolation
rule) the probability that agents will use it will be small.
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2.4 Defining Animal Spirits
The forecasts made by extrapolators and fundamentalists play an important role in the
model. In order to highlight this role we derive an index of market sentiments from the
endogenously obtained fractions αe , tand αf , t. We will call these “animal
spirits”(Keynes 1936; Farmer 2006; Akerlof and Shiller 2009). They reflect how
optimistic or pessimistic these forecasts are, and they are obtained endogenously from
the model.
The definition of animal spirits is as follows:
St ¼ αe;t −
α f ;t if yt−1 > 0
− αe;t þ α f ;t if yt−1 < 0

ð28Þ
where St is the index of animal spirits. This can change between −1 and +1. There are two
possibilities:
& When yt − 1 > 0, extrapolators forecast a positive output gap. The fraction of agents
who make such a positive forecasts is αe , t. Fundamentalists, however, then make a
pessimistic forecast since they expect the positive output gap to decline towards the
equilibrium value of 0. The fraction of agents who make such a forecast is αf , t. We
subtract this fraction of pessimistic forecasts from the fraction αe , t who make a
positive forecast. When these two fractions are equal to each other (both are then 0.5)
market sentiments (animal spirits) are neutral, i.e. optimists and pessimists cancel
out and St = 0. When the fraction of optimists αe , t exceeds the fraction of
pessimists αf , t ,St becomes positive. As we will see, the model allows for the
possibility that αe , t moves to 1. In that case there are only optimists and St = 1.
& When yt − 1 < 0, extrapolators forecast a negative output gap. The fraction of agents
who make such a negative forecasts is αe , t. We give this fraction a negative sign.
Fundamentalists, however, then make an optimistic forecast since they expect the
negative output gap to increase towards the equilibrium value of 0. The fraction of
agents who make such a forecast is αf , t. We give this fraction of optimistic forecasts
a positive sign. When these two fractions are equal to each other (both are then 0.5)
market sentiments (animal spirits) are neutral, i.e. optimists and pessimists cancel
out and St = 0. When the fraction of pessimists αe , t exceeds the fraction of
optimists αf , t St becomes negative. The fraction of pessimists, αe , t, can move to
1. In that case there are only pessimists and St = −1.
We can rewrite (28) as follows3:
St ¼
αe;t − 1 − αe;t
  ¼ 2 αe;t − 1 if yt−1 > 0
− αe;t þ 1 − αe;t
  ¼ −2 αe;t þ 1 if yt−1 < 0

ð29Þ
3 In De Grauwe (2012) animal spirits are defined so as to move between 0 and 1. It can be shown that the
animal sprits defined here are the same apart from a linear transformation that allows the animal sprits index to
move between −1 and +1.
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It should be noted that these animal spirits are unrelated to “sunspot equilibria” in the
sense of Cass and Shell (1983). The latter arise because of the existence of a random
variable individuals believe matters for the economic outcome. Our animal spirits arise
endogenously as a result of agents with cognitive limitations switching between different
heuristics in search of the best possible forecast.
2.5 Solution of the Model
The solution procedure of the model is described in appendix 1. As the model is highly
non-linear we calibrate it and use numerical methods to solve it. The table with the
numerical values given to the coefficients, and which we obtain from the literature
(see e.g. Galí (2008)) is presented in appendix 2. We will perform extensive sensitivity
analysis to check the robustness of our results.
3 Results of the Model: the Basics
In this section we present some of the basic results of simulating the model using the
calibration discussed in the previous section. We present the results both for the
monetary union model (one central bank) and the monetary independence model
(two-country model with separate central banks).
3.1 Monetary Union Model
We first present the results of the simulation exercises in the time domain. This will allow us
to understand the dynamics produced by the model. In the next sections we perform
sensitivity analyses. Figure 4 presents the simulated output gaps in the two countries. We
find a relatively high correlation of these output gaps between the two countries. This
correlation is 0.95. Underlying this is an import propensity (m) of 0.3 and a correlation of the
exogenous demand shocks of 0.2. Thus the model produces a synchronization of the
business cycle that adds to the trade integration effect and the existence of correlated
exogenous demand shocks. The additional synchronization comes from “the animal spirits”.
Fig. 4 Simulation of the output gaps in countries 1 and 2
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These are shown in Fig. 5. As explained in the previous section, the “animal spirits”measure
market sentiments, i.e. optimism and pessimism in forecasting.
We observe that the model produces waves of optimism and pessimism that can lead
to a situation where everybody becomes optimist (St = 1) or pessimist (St = −1). These
waves of optimism and pessimism are generated endogenously and arise because
optimistic (pessimistic) forecasts are self-fulfilling and therefore attract more agents
into being optimists (pessimists).
The correlation of these animal spirits and the output gap is high. In the simulations
reported in Fig. 5 this correlation reaches 0.94. Underlying this correlation is the self-
fulfilling nature of expectations. When a wave of optimism is set in motion, this leads
to an increase in aggregate demand (see Eq. 1). This increase in aggregate demand
leads to a situation in which those who have made optimistic forecasts are vindicated.
This attracts more agents using optimistic forecasts. This leads to a self-fulfilling
dynamics in which most agents become optimists. It is a dynamics that leads to a
correlation of the same beliefs.
The reverse is also true. A wave of pessimistic forecasts can set in motion a self-
fulfilling dynamics leading to a downturn in economic activity (output gap). At some
point most of the agents have become pessimists.
It now appears that the model produces an international contagion of animal spirits. This
is seen from the same Fig. 5 showing the animal spirits in both countries. These animal
spirits are highly correlated between the two countries reaching 0.95. The mechanism that
produces this can be described as follows. When a wave of optimism is set in motion in
country 1, it leads to more output and imports in that country, thereby increasing output in
country 2. This positive transmission, even if small, makes it more likely that agents in
country 2 that make optimistic forecasts are vindicated, thereby increasing the fraction of
agents in country 2 that become optimists. Thus we obtain a transmission dynamics that
although triggered by trade flows is amplified and leads to a strong synchronization of the
business cycles across countries. In section 4 we will give more precise information on the
relative importance of trade and animal spirits in producing synchronization of business
cycles.
The previous analysis has identified the dynamics that leads to strong synchroniza-
tion of the business cycle across countries in a monetary union. This dynamics is based
on the international contagion of optimism and pessimism (animal spirits) in a
Fig. 5 Simulation of the animal spirits in countries 1 and 2
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monetary union. Is this contagion also present in countries that have a separate currency
and their own central bank? This question is discussed in the next section.
3.2 Monetary Independence Model
In this section we present the result for the two-country model with two independent central
banks. In Figs. 6 and 7 we present the results of simulating the model assuming two
currencies and two separate central banks. Figure 6 shows the movements of the output
gaps in the two countries and Figs. 7 the animal spirits in these two countries. We observe a
similar dynamics as in the previous section. The correlation between the output gaps in the
two countries, however, is smaller, i.e. 0.73 (versus 0.95 in the previous section). This has to
do with the lower correlation of animal spirits between the two countries, i.e. 0.70, (versus
0.94 in the previous section). Nevertheless it is interesting to find that the behavioral model
also produces a strong synchronization of the business cycles across countries that have
maintained their own currencies.
It should be mentioned that we produce simulation results assuming the same parameter
values of the model in both monetary regimes. In particular, we assume the same degree of
trade integration and the same correlation of the exogenous shocks. Thus, the lower
correlation of output gaps obtained here compared to the monetary union must be due to
other factors. We will show in the next section that the difference in correlation of output
gaps and animals spirits across countries has to do with the existence of one central bank in
the monetary union model, and two central banks in the second model.
4 Results of the Model: Factors Affecting Correlation of Business Cycle
In this section we analyze the factors that influence the correlation of the business
cycles across countries. We do this by presenting sensitivity analyses, i.e. we study how
the correlations of the output gaps between the two countries are influenced by a
number of important parameters of the model. We will focus on trade integration, the
correlations of exogenous shocks, and the degree of stabilization of the output gap by
the common central bank. We do this for the two monetary regimes, i.e. monetary union
and separate central bank.
Fig. 6 Simulation of the output gaps in countries 1 and 2
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4.1 Monetary Union Model and Trade Integration
We first focus on how trade integration (measured by the import propensities, m) affects
the correlation of output gaps and animal spirits across countries. We show the results
in Figs. 8 and 9. On the horizontal axis we set out the import propensities and allow it to
change from 0 to 1. On the vertical axis we set out the correlation of output gaps
between the two countries (Fig. 8) and the correlation of animal spirits (Fig. 9) that we
obtain in the model for each value of m. We find strikingly that even when there is no
trade between the two countries (m = 0) the model produces positive correlations of
output gaps and animal spirits. As trade integration increases the degree of correlation
increases. This relation is highly non-linear. When m increases the correlations
increase very fast and then level off for values of m equal to approximately 0.4.
Further trade integration has very little additional impact on the synchronization of the
business cycles.
Two results stand out here. First the fact that even in the absence of trade there is
some synchronization of the business cycles and of animal spirits. This has to do with
the fact that underlying this result is a positive correlation of exogenous demand shocks
(0.2). We discuss the importance of varying this parameter in the next section.
Fig. 7 Simulation of the animal spirits in countries 1 and 2
import propensity
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
c
o
rr
e
la
tio
n
o
u
tp
u
t
c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
1
a
n
d
2
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
correlation output countries 1 and 2Fig. 8 Correlation of output gaps
and import propensities
400 De Grauwe P., Ji Y.
The other interesting result is the non-linear relation between the intensity of trade
and the synchronization of the business cycles. Most of the synchronization is reached
for relatively low levels of trade integration. Thus relatively low levels of trade are
enough to trigger the contagion of animal spirits and through this channel the synchro-
nization of the business cycles. This may explain why we find that among a group of
highly integrated industrial countries increasing integration has only weak effects on
the correlation of output (see Figs. 2 and 3).
4.2 Monetary Independence Model and Trade Integration
Figures 10 and 11 show the results of the sensitivity of the synchronization of the
business cycle with respect to trade integration in the two-country model with two
central banks. The results are qualitatively similar to the results in a monetary union, i.e.
the non-linear relation between synchronization and import propensity. The difference
lies in the fact that for each value ofm the corresponding correlation is lower than in the
monetary union case.
4.3 Synchronization of Business Cycles and Correlation of Shocks
Figures 12 and 13 show the sensitivity of the synchronization of business cycles to the
correlation of shocks in themonetary union (left panels) and in themonetary independence
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model (right panels). We assume shocks both in the demand and supply
equations. We vary the correlation between −1 and 1. The vertical axes as
before show the correlations of output gaps and animal spirits across countries.
The most surprising aspect of these results is that with a perfectly negative
correlation of the shocks, the correlation of animal spirits is still positive
(approximately 0.2) in a monetary union. As a result, the correlation of output
gaps is not −1 (as one may have expected), but approximately −0.6.
Where does this come from? The answer is the existence of one central bank.
The latter sets an interest rate that is the same for both countries according to the
Taylor rule. This interest rate setting relation is also subject to random shocks. But
since the same rule applies to both countries one has a source of common shocks in
these two countries. This then allows animal spirits to be positively correlated even
if all the other shocks are negatively correlated.
In both cases we observe again a non-linearity in the relation between correlation of
shocks and the correlation of the output gaps. This non-linearity is most pronounced in the
monetary union: small declines in the (negative) correlation of the shocks leads to a quick
increase in the synchronization of the business cycles (correlation of output gaps). As a
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result, with a correlation of shocks equal to 0 the correlation of output gaps reaches 0.7 (see
Fig. 12).
This feature is less pronounced in the model of two countries with two central banks
(right panels). With correlation of shocks equal to 0 the correlation of output gaps is
positive at about 0.4 but lower than in the monetary union. This difference (0.4 versus
0.7) has to do with the fact that in this model two central banks set their own interest
rate thereby eliminating a source of common shock.
The previous results illustrate an essential feature of our model. This is that even in
the absence of correlation of exogenous shocks, the model produces a synchronization
of the business cycles endogenously. Put differently, even if shocks are not correlated
there is an endogenous mechanism that transforms uncorrelated (and even negatively
correlated shocks) into positive correlations of output across countries. The mechanism
that produces this was suggested earlier and can be described as follows. Small shocks
in output (positive or negative) in one country set in motion a domestic and an
international self-reinforcing mechanism. The domestic one comes about through the
interaction between changes in the output gap and animal spirits, whereby the positive
(negative) output gap creates positive (negative) expectations. The latter then feeds back on
the output gap. As a result, there is a two-way causality between the output gap and animal
spirits in each country. We illustrate this feature in Table 3. We tested for Granger causality
between the simulated output gap (Y1) and animal spirits (ANSPIRITS1) in our model. We
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Table 3 Pairwise Granger causality tests
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.
Lags: 1
Y1 does not Granger Cause ANSPIRITS1 1998 681.507 2E-129
ANSPIRITS1 does not Granger Cause Y1 134.629 4.E-30
Lags: 2
Y1 does not Granger Cause ANSPIRITS1 1997 162.508 4.E-66
ANSPIRITS1 does not Granger Cause Y1 50.0886 6.E-22
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find that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the output gap Granger causes animal spirits
and vice versa.
The international self-reinforcing mechanism starts from a shock in one country that
is transmitted through trade to the other country, where it sets in motion a self-
reinforcing mechanism with animal spirits. This is then transmitted back to the first
country. All this leads to the result that an idiosyncratic (uncorrelated) shock in one
country leads to correlated output and animal spirits across countries.
4.4 Synchronization of Business Cycles and Output Stabilization
The degree of output stabilization exerted by the central bank has important effects on
the emergence of animal spirits in our behavioral model. We showed earlier (De
Grauwe 2012) that by a more forceful output stabilization (as measured by the
coefficient c2 in the Taylor rule equation), the central bank can reduce the intensity
of the movements in animal spirits. Given the importance of animal spirits in propa-
gating business cycles from one country to the other, the central bank’s stabilization
efforts can have a significant impact on this propagation. We analyze this issue here.
We do this by studying the sensitivity of the correlations of the output gaps and
animal spirits with respect the output coefficient c2 in the Taylor rule. We do this for
both the monetary union model and the model with two central banks. The results are
shown in Figs. 14 and 15. We allow the Taylor output parameter (c2) to vary from 0 to 2
(horizontal axes) and compute the corresponding correlations of the output gaps
(Fig. 14) and animal spirits (Fig. 15).
The results confirm the importance of output stabilization for the international
propagation of business cycles. In general when the central bank increases its effort
to stabilize output (c2 increases) the correlation of the output gaps across countries
declines. Not surprisingly this effect is strongest in the model of monetary indepen-
dence. The reason is that in this model the existence of two central banks increases their
effectiveness in “taming the animal spirits”. As a result the international propagation of
these animal spirits is also reduced. This leads to less synchronization of the business cycles.
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5 Empirical Verification
Our model has a number of precise predictions that we will subject to empirical testing
in this section. We first discuss these theoretical predictions. We then discuss the testing
procedure and the results.
5.1 Theoretical Predictions
We selected two predictions of our model.
& There is a two-way causality between animal spirits and the output gap, i.e. positive
(negative) animal spirits produce a positive (negative) output gap; conversely, a
positive (negative) output gap leads to positive (negative) animal spirits. This is in
fact a key feature of our theoretical model, which produces a self-reinforcing
mechanism that leads to booms and busts, characterized by extreme optimism
and pessimism. We have shown this feature in Table 3 where we applied a
Granger-causality test on the simulated output gap and animal spirits in country 1
(the results are very similar for country 2) and assuming a monetary union.
& Countries that trade with each other experience high correlations of animal spirits.
This feature was shown in Fig. 9. We found that when imported consumption
exceeds 20% the correlation of animal spirits between countries reaches 0.9 and
more, creating the impression that these countries are subject to the same animal
spirits.
5.2 Empirical Verification
We now proceed to empirically verifying the two theoretical predictions of our model.
& Do we find a two-way causality between animal spirits and output gap in different
countries? In order to answer this question we have to find an empirical counterpart
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of animal spirits. We decided to select business sentiment indicators. These are
collected in most countries. The OECD publishes such indicators for most member
countries. We will focus on the Eurozone countries here.
We performed Granger causality tests between the business confidence index
and the output gap for the Eurozone countries during the period 1995–2015. The
results are shown in Table 4. For two countries (Italy and Portugal) the series
exhibited a unit root. For these two countries we used the first differences of these
variables.
With a few exceptions we find that in most countries we cannot reject the hypothesis
of a two-way causality between the output gap and the indicators of business senti-
ments. This confirms one of the key predictions of our model, i.e. the dynamics of
booms and busts is characterized by a process by which waves of optimism and
pessimism drive the business cycle, while the latter also influences optimism and
pessimism (Table 3).
& Animal spirits play an important role in our model and are at the core of the
international transmission of business cycles. We have noted that the latter are
highly correlated among industrialized countries. Can we observe a similar degree
of correlation of animal spirits as our theoretical model predicts? We used the same
business confidence indicators of the previous section and computed the bilateral
correlation coefficients during the sample period 1995–2014. We show these
bilateral correlation coefficients for the Eurozone and the non-Eurozone OECD-
countries in Table 5. We find quite large correlation coefficients as predicted by our
model. We also observe that the correlation coefficients in the Eurozone on average
are higher than among the other OECD countries, a result that our model also
predicts.
6 Conclusion
We started this paper by the observation that the degree of synchronization of the
business cycles in the industrialized world is very high. It is also higher than what
can be explained by trade flows. Mainstream macroeconomic models (Real
Business Cycle and DSGE) have found it difficult to replicate the high degree
of synchronization in open economy versions of these models. In general they
have only be able to do this by assuming sufficiently high correlations of
exogenous shocks. Recent attempts to introduce financial flows in these models
have been more successful but have also have to rely on assumptions that
exogenous financial shocks are correlated, thereby admitting that much of the
synchronization of the business cycles finds its origin outside the macroeconomic
model.
In this paper we used a two-country behavioral macroeconomic model where the
synchronization of the business cycle is produced endogenously. The main channel of
synchronization occurs through a propagation of “animal spirits”, i.e. waves of opti-
mism and pessimism that get correlated internationally. We found that this propagation
occurs with relatively low levels of trade integration. In addition, once a particular level
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of trade integration is reached further integration does not increase the synchronization
of business cycles anymore.
We also found that the propagation of animal spirits and thus the synchronization of
the business cycles is stronger among countries that are members of a monetary union
than among “standalone countries” that have their own independent central banks. This
difference occurs because in a monetary union the common central bank is a source of
common shocks. This helps to introduce correlation between the animal spirits of the
member countries.
The degree of output synchronization is very much influenced by the intensity with
which the central bank stabilizes output. When that intensity is high, the central bank is
able “to tame the animal spirits”. In so doing it reduces the propagation dynamics of
these animal spirits.
Table 5 Bilateral correlations of business confidence index
Eurozone countries
Austria Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland
Austria 1.0000
Belgium 0.8551 1.0000
Finland 0.8055 0.8901 1.0000
France 0.7211 0.8295 0.8255 1.0000
Germany 0.8979 0.8532 0.7610 0.7388 1.0000
Greece 0.3179 0.4565 0.5435 0.6260 0.2159 1.0000
Ireland 0.3148 0.6257 0.6031 0.6454 0.5644 0.5207 1.0000
Italy 0.6379 0.7740 0.8243 0.8786 0.6635 0.7223 0.6767
Netherlands 0.7134 0.8397 0.8436 0.8576 0.7803 0.6865 0.7711
Portugal 0.5196 0.7159 0.7551 0.8279 0.5506 0.8056 0.6526
Spain 0.6172 0.7053 0.7932 0.8529 0.5413 0.8291 0.4719
Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain
Italy 1.0000
Netherlands 0.8581 1.0000
Portugal 0.8128 0.8821 1.0000
Spain 0.8552 0.8022 0.8507 1.0000
Stand-alone countries
Australia Czech Denmark Hungary Japan Korea Norway
Australia 1.0000
Czech 0.2203 1.0000
Denmark 0.1573 0.7358 1.0000
Hungary 0.2829 0.6538 0.7191 1.0000
Japan 0.1322 0.7100 0.6118 0.4641 1.0000
Korea -0.1042 0.0319 0.2308 0.4834 -0.2284 1.0000
Norway 0.3020 0.7140 0.8034 0.6670 0.7021 0.2786 1.0000
Poland 0.1350 0.7073 0.6189 0.6086 0.7228 0.1642 0.6680
Sweden 0.2898 0.6951 0.7166 0.7535 0.4932 0.2392 0.6114
Switzerland 0.1264 0.7504 0.6877 0.5777 0.6214 0.0400 0.6219
UK 0.2556 0.6779 0.7263 0.8065 0.6957 0.0582 0.6545
US 0.6672 0.3935 0.4621 0.4681 0.4211 -0.0640 0.5495
Poland Sweden Switzerland UK US
Poland 1.0000
Sweden 0.6962 1.0000
Switzerland 0.6972 0.7647 1.0000
UK 0.6452 0.6764 0.5609 1.0000
US 0.3535 0.5281 0.2746 0.5276 1.0000
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There are a number of limitations of our analysis. One is that the exchange rate
channel in the transmission process was not modeled. This is of no importance for the
monetary union model. It matters for the model of two standalone countries with their
own central banks. Another one is that in the monetary union model assumes that the
import propensity is exogenous and not sensitive to relative price changes. We plan to
do research in these two channels in the future.
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Appendix 1: Solving the model assuming that π* = 0
Common central bank
The solution of the model is found by first substituting (7) into (1) and (4) and rewriting
in matrix notation. This yields:
1−
0:5*a2*c2
1þ m −
0:5*a2*c2þ m
1þ m −
0:5*a2*c1
1þ m −
0:5*a2*c1
1þ m
−
0:5*a2*c2þ m
1þ m 1−
0:5*a2*c2
1þ m −
0:5*a2*c1
1þ m −
0:5*a2*c1
1þ m
−b2 0 1 0
0 −b2 0 1
2
666664
3
777775
y1t
y2t
π1t
π2t
2
664
3
775 ¼
a1
1þ m 0
−a2
1þ m 0
0
a1
1þ m 0
−a2
1þ m
0 0 b1 0
0 0 0 b1
2
66664
3
77775
~Ety1t
~Ety2t
~Etπ1t
~Etπ2t
2
66664
3
77775þ
1−a1
1þ m 0 0 0
0
1−a1
1þ m 0 0
0 0 1−b1 0
0 0 0 1−b1
2
666664
3
777775
y1t−1
y2t−1
π1t−1
π2t−1
2
664
3
775þ
a2*c3
a2*c3
0
0
2
664
3
775rt−1 þ
a2*ut
1þ m þ
ε1t
1þ m
a2*ut
1þ m þ
ε2t
1þ m
η1t
η2t
2
6666664
3
7777775
Or
AZt ¼ BfEt Ztþ1 þ CZt−1 þ brt−1 þ vt ð30Þ
where bold characters refer to matrices and vectors. The solution for Zt is given by
Zt ¼ A−1 BfEt Ztþ1 þ CZt−1 þ brt−1 þ vth i ð31Þ
The solution exists if the matrix A is non-singular. The system (31) describes the
solution for y1t ;y
2
t ;π
1
t and π
2
t given the forecasts of y
1
t ;y
2
t ;π
1
t and π
2
t . The latter have been
specified in Eqs. (16) to (27) and can be substituted into (A2). We then obtain a system
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of non-linear difference equations. Finally, the solution for rt. is found by substituting yt
and πt obtained from (31) into (7).
The model has non-linear features making it difficult to arrive at analytical solutions.
That is why we will use numerical methods to analyze its dynamics. In order to do so,
we have to calibrate the model, i.e. to select numerical values for the parameters of the
model. In appendix 2 the parameters used in the calibration exercise are presented.
They are based on Gali (2008). The model was calibrated in such a way that the time
units can be considered to be quarters. A sensitivity analysis of the main results to
changes in the some of the parameters of the model will be presented. The three shocks
(demand shocks, supply shocks and interest rate shocks) are independently and iden-
tically distributed (i.i.d.) with standard deviations of 0.5%. We allow the demand and
supply shocks to be correlated across countries. It will turn out that these correlations
affect the transmission of business cycles across countries.
Two country model with 2 central banks
Similar to the solutions to the model of a common central bank, we have the following
for a two country model with 2 central banks.
1−
a2*c2
1þ m −
m
1þ m −
a2*c1
1þ m 0
−
m
1þ m 1−
a2*c2
1þ m 0 −
a2*c1
1þ m
−b2 0 1 0
0 −b2 0 1
2
666664
3
777775
y1t
y2t
π1t
π2t
2
664
3
775
¼
a1
1þ m 0
−a2
1þ m 0
0
a1
1þ m 0
−a2
1þ m
0 0 b1 0
0 0 0 b1
2
666664
3
777775
eEty1teEty2teEtπ2teEtπ2t
2
66664
3
77775 þ
1−a1
1þ m 0 0 0
0
1−a1
1þ m 0 0
0 0 1−b1 0
0 0 0 1−b1
2
666664
3
777775
y1t−1
y2t−1
π1t−1
π2t−1
2
664
3
775
þ
a2*c3
1þ m
0
0
0
2
6664
3
7775r1t−1 þ
0
a2*c3
1þ m
0
0
2
6664
3
7775r2t−1 þ
a2*ut
1þ m þ
ε2t
1þ m
a2*ut
1þ m þ
ε2t
1þ m
η1t
η2t
2
6666664
3
7777775
Or
AZt ¼ BfEt Ztþ1 þ CZt−1 þ b1r1t−1 þ b2r2t−1 þ vt ð32Þ
where bold characters refer to matrices and vectors. The solution for Zt is given by
Zt ¼ A−1 BfEt Ztþ1 þ CZt−1 þ b1r1t−1 þ b2r2t−1 þ vth i ð33Þ
The solution is obtained by substituting the forecasts of output gap and inflation obtained
from (14)–(27).
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